Last year San Francisco mayor Gavin Newsom took it upon himself to interpret the state's Constitution and to grant marriage licenses to same-sex couples, in violation of state law: "Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California." (Cal. Family Code 308.5) This statute was enacted by the people of California as ballot initiative Proposition 22 in 2000. As enacted, it cannot be modified or repealed by the state legislature without approval of the people. (Cal. Const. Art. II. Sec. 10(c)) Newsom timed his decree to coincide with Valentine's Day, and plunged the city into a fair bit of chaos as scores of same-sex couples became "married," only to have their hopes dashed when the inevitable happened.
In a well-timed event, the San Francisco-based University of California Hastings College of the Law's Constitutional Law Quarterly sponsored a panel discussion on same-sex marriage last Friday. (
San Francisco Chronicle,
campus announcement (PDF))
The Chron summarizes the debate:
Legal scholars and advocates debated same-sex marriage before a law school audience Friday, arguing over the purpose of marriage, whether gay and lesbian couples are comparable to polygamists, and whether a federal constitutional amendment would respect or trample states' authority.
0. Levels of Scrutiny
While these are all worthy topics of conversation, it does not reach a central issue at the heart of the constitutional debate: what level of scrutiny to apply to a legal claim of a right to same-sex marriage? Legal doctrine as it has evolved (or rather, has been intelligently designed over time) sets forth three categories of judicial review, or tiers of scrutiny, of government actions. The first is strict scrutiny, requiring a compelling government interest and means that are narrowly tailored to accomplish this goal. A law discriminating on the basis of race, for example, triggers strict scrutiny, because race is regarded as a suspect classification that warrants this heightened level of review. The second is intermediate scrutiny, which requires an important government purpose and means that are substantially related to this objective. Gender classifications fall under this rubric. The third is rational basis analysis, requiring a rational basis and means that are rationally related to the purpose.
The effect is that a law that is subject is strict scrutiny will almost certainly be declared unconstitutional by the reviewing court. The opposite is true for a law that is examined under the rational basis standard. And the murky middle is, well, the murky middle.
The basic question, then, is what level of scrutiny to apply to a claim that a law that embodies the traditional definition of marriage of one man and one woman denies the equal protection of the law to same-sex couples? It all depends on the level of scrutiny applied.
Historically, no court has applied heightened scrutiny to homosexual persons seeking to alter marriage laws to support a definition of marriage as between two persons, regardless of gender. That is significant. Race is treated as a suspect classification because it is regarded as an immutable characteristic that is intrinsically irrelevant to making legal distinctions under the law. Likewise gender is also irrelevant to many, if not most legal distinctions; however, it is obvious that some differentiation on the basis of gender is appropriate. For example, the principle of "separate but equal" makes perfect sense when applied to separate bathroom facilities for men and women, but it does not make sense when applied to separate public elementary schools for black children and white children.
However, sexual orientation is a different matter. People debate the origins of differences in sexual orientation and the role of genetic determination, one's social environment and childhood, emotional desire, personal lifestyle choice, and one's convictions about the good life. There are cases of people who claim to have altered their sexual orientation from homosexual to heterosexual, though they are often rather unfairly dismissed. In this light it is far from certain that sexual orientation is unchosen and fixed, or strongly determined. Even if it were the case, that does not resolve the question of whether homosexuality is a normal alternative structuring of sexual practice, or whether it is a defect. Moreover, there are numerous sexual practices listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (current version DSM-IV). (Homosexuality was removed, relatively recently, from the list.) Whether they ought to be tolerated privately is one thing, and whether they warrant public endorsement and protection in the form of a state-issued license and a set of legal rights and duties is another.
1. The Purpose of Marriage
Nevertheless, the debate focused on the purpose of marriage, which is a more cogent way to understand that issue than to look at the nature of rights. The language of rights, as Harvard professor Mary Ann Glendon discusses in her 1991 book, Rights Talk, is a distorted way to speak about politics insofar as it draws the speakers into focusing exclusively on the individual, and not on community, on rights and entitlement, not on duty and service. Ultimately, politics is concerned with the common good of all at least as much as it is concerned with the protection of the individual person.
"What they're asking the courts to do is change the structure of marriage, '' said Jeffrey Ventrella, a lawyer with the Alliance Defense Fund, which represents opponents of same-sex marriage in the court case.
Douglas Kmiec, a conservative Pepperdine University law professor, said the state has a legitimate interest in limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples because "the essential aspect of marriage has always been related to procreation.'' With population declines reported in industrialized nations, he said, the state can justify a law "encouraging the relationships that result in children" and encouraging men, in particular, to take responsibility for their children.
Tobias Barrington Wolff, a liberal UC Davis law professor, retorted that marriage in the United States has changed substantially since the mid-19th century, when married women had no right to own property or refuse sex with their husbands.
While law in America disfavored women in marriage, and the states rightfully modified their laws accordingly, Wolff's response is inapposite and does not address the central issue: the purpose of marriage. His rejoinder, while it might suggest that historic understandings of different aspects of marriage were flawed, offers no positive comments about the meaning of marriage.
Kmiec emphasizes here the fundamental state interest in promoting marriage. Indeed, as Ventrella and certainly others have pointed out, the main reason why people would even countenance state intrusion into the most intimate of human associations is the fact that children are involved in marriage, and their protection and upbringing is of paramount interest to the state.
The deeper essence of marriage, of course, is not successful procreation but it is rather grounded in the complementary union of the male and the female. It is this institution that is basic to human nature, to what Hadley Arkes would call the natural teleology of the body. Marriage in and of itself, then exists prior to the modern state, which has an interest in upholding marriage, in terms of the definition of marriage as well as conduct pertaining to marriage. Much more could be said on the basic meaning of marriage, but it is probably safe to stop here for the moment.
2. Polygamy
The argument about polygamy is important, and instructive.
Ventrella also contended that legalization of same-sex marriage would eliminate the rationale for banning polygamy, because marriage would no longer be defined as a union of a man and a woman.
Wolff disagreed, saying anti-polygamy laws could be justified to protect women from exploitation, and because -- unlike gays and lesbians -- heterosexuals remain free to marry one partner of their choice at a time.
Insofar as advocates of same-sex marriage exclude from consideration the concepts of natural law, the complementary nature of the male-female union, the traditions of the nation and human civilization, the state interest in the most stable context for procreation and child-rearing, the sole basis for same-sex marriage is subjective individual preference and desire. Given that as a basis, it is difficult to see anything special about a two person relationship rather than one that involves more people.
Moreover, the argument against exploitation fails, for example, in cases of polyandry (multiple males with a single woman), or in cases where an equal number of men and women are involved in some sort of relationship. Moreover, the analysis fails because it is rooted in individual desire, not a grounding in nature. The polygamist can easily say to the objecting homosexual,"Who are you to say that my relationship is any less worthy than yours? I am a consenting adult who has chosen this lifestyle, and who are you to deny me the right to civil marriage?"
3. Federal Constitutional Amendment
"You shouldn't cut off a debate that's just beginning to take place nationally" by locking a definition of marriage into the Constitution, Amar argued. Stewart, the city's lawyer, said the amendment flies in the face of states' long-standing authority to regulate marriage.
But Kmiec said a constitutional amendment is "the ultimate act of federalism'' because it must be ratified by three-fourths of the states after approval by two-thirds of each house of Congress. With an amendment, he said, the debate "is not going to be in the courthouses, it's going to be in the (state) assembly houses."
Contra Amar, another way of looking at this debate is that is a variation of an earlier debate that occurred decades ago over the question of polygamy. The United States took the strongest position possible that marriage is between one man and one woman, and that territories wishing to join the union had to conform to this definition. The same logic that applies to polygamy may also be profitably applied to same-sex marriage; that is, an argument grounded on complementarity, not simply two spouses versus multiple spouses.
Moreover, on the question of enforcement, a single national definition of marriage as one man and one woman does not necessarily mean that the federal government will impose its will on the states. In light of the fact that a federal constitutional amendment will merely preserve the already-existing traditional understanding of marriage, that is unlikely to happen. Additionally, in some of its weaker forms, it seems that a proposed amendment would merely prevent judges from imposing same-sex marriage on the states, allowing state legislatures to create same-sex marriage if they desire.
As a more basic matter, the power of the people of the United States to create new constitutional amendments should not be disparaged. Much (perhaps all?) of the power of the legal and cultural elite over the people is a matter of coercion. It is a unique kind of coercion, not one that is based on force, but on convincing people of their intellectual and moral incapacity: their views are irrational and that they are bigots. See Thomas Sowell's Vision of the Anointed for a discussion of the contempt of the anointed for the benighted.
The amendment process, unlike the several strategies employed by judges to make policy without reference to the original meaning of the Constitution, is actually grounded in the plain text of the Constitution, and is the authorized means for changing the Constitution. Moreover, the Constitution does not limit the amendment process to merely procedural changes, such as changing the minimum voting age, but it also for substantive changes, such as the post-Civil War Reconstruction-era Amendments that secured the rights of blacks.
Kmiec accurately describes the amendment process as the ultimate act of federalism, as the Constitution puts in place procedural safeguards that prevent easy amendment of the national charter. However, when there is a challenge to the essential nature of the fundamental building block of all civilization, an amendment that secures that social institution against alteration sounds reasonable, at the very least.
For further reading:
A succinct article yet comprehensive in its scope, from Family Research Council
Questions and Answers: What's Wrong With Letting Same-Sex Couples "Marry?"